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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah as

the Court since it is the appellant forum for review of
administrative orders of the Industrial Commission of
the State of Utah.

II.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal of John Wakefield, Appellant, is

from an order of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security in
which the Board of Review of said administrative agency
denied appellants claim for unemployment compensation.
Said decision of the Board of Review is dated November 16, 1987.
Prior proceedings concerning this case are as
follows:
A.

August 10, 1987 appellant's claim for un-

employment insurance benefits.
B.

Employer Notice of Claim fi]|ed on August 20, 1987.

C.

Decision of Eligibility for Unemployment

Insurance Benefits denying benefits dated August 28, 1987.
D.

Appeal to Administrative Law| Judge which is

dated August 31, 1987.
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Hearing held before Administrative Law Judge

on September 22, 1987.
F.

The Decision of the Administrative Law Judge

dated September 2 8 , 1987, which was issued in amended form
on October 5, 1987.
G.

Appeal to the Board of Review of the Industrial

Commmission dated October 1, 1987.
H.

Decision of the Board of Review dated

November 17, 1987.
I.

III.

Docketing Statement filed December 3 0 , 1987.

THE ISSUES
Whether the denial of unemployment compensation

benefits to the appellant is lawful in light of the totality
of circumstances surrounding appellants employment with
Orem City.

An issue is also raised on whether Mr. Wakefield

in light of his circumstances on a lay-off from Geneva
was required to accept employment at three-dollars and fiftycents per hour with Orem, and if requiring Mr. Wakefield to
maintain his employment with the City of Orem was a matter
of form and not substance.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUES
Utah Code Annotated, 1953

(as amended) provides

at Section 35-4-5 "Ineligibility for benefits.

An individual

is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing
a waiting period:
Voluntarily Leaving Work.
(a)

For the week in which the claimant left work

voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the commission,
and for each week thereafter until the claimant has performed
services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages
for those services equal to at least six times the claimant's
weekly benefit amount.

A claimant shall ijiot be denied

eligibility for benefits if the claimant Reaves work under
circumstances of such a nature that it woijld be contrary
to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employer,
consider for the purposes of this act the reasonableness of
the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market
in reaching a determination of whether thel ineligibility of a
claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.
Notwithstanding any other provis ion of this section,
a claimant who has left work voluntarily tb accompany, follow
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or join his or her spouse to or in a new locality does
so

without good cause for purposes of this subsection."

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a ruling of the Industrial

Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security in
which the Board of Review of said administrative agency
denied the appellant's claim for unemployment compensation.
Mr. Wakefield, a former Geneva Works employee, was working
for Pinkerton Security Services when he quite said employment
to accept a position with the City of Orem and began to work
for the City of Orem on or about May 18, 1987 and worked for
two days for a total of 16 hours.

It is apparent from the

record in this case that the hiring of Mr. Wakefield by the
City of Orem did not follow the general hiring practices
of the City of Orem.

Mr. Wakefield's contention has been that

the City of Orem hired him as a part-time employee for sixdollars and sixty-cents per hour.

Mr. Wakefield has further

contented that upon his arrival on the job with the City of Orem
he was informed by a supervisor that he would be paid threedollars and fifty-cents per hour.

Further, while in the employ

of the City of Orem, Mr. Wakefield's vehicle was vandalised.

1
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In addition, Mr. Wakefield contends that 6n his last day
of work he had a discussion with his supervisor in which he
complained of the vandalism of his vehicle, payment of the
three-dollars and fifty-cents per hour, safety of the employee
while operating equipment for the city of Orem, and further
that he would return to work upon resolution of these problems.
Mr. Wakefield left numerous telephone messages for his
supervisor and it is Mr. Wakefield1s contention that none of
the telephone calls were returned.
After a period of time, Mr. Wakefield applied for
unemployment compensation on August 10, 1^87.

Subsequent

to that application Mr. Wakefield's claim for unemployment
benefits have been uniformly denied by th^ Utah Department of
Employment Security originally and through various appeals of
that original decision.

Mr. Wakefield has complied with and

has completely exhaused the administrative remedies available
to him under the Utah Employment Security Act.
A further issue was raised at the September 22, 1987
meeting before Administrative Law Judge, 9 tanley H. Griffin.
That issue was whether Mr. Wakefield was r equired to accept
employment at a wage less than $4.90 per hJ our.

The Administrative

Law Judge made no finding of the affect of the Trade Readjustment
Act and the requirement for the Mr. Wakefil|eld to accept
employment at less than $4.90 per hour.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

VI.

Page 6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant, Mr. Wakefield, has been disqualified

from the benefits of Unemployment Compensation Insurance
since he left his employment with the City of Orem without
good cause.

Appellant's argument is that with the totality

of the circumstances surrounding his employment with Orem
City, he should not be denied eligibility for benefits of
Unemployment Compensation Insurance since Mr. Wakefield left
work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be
contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
Further, the Administrative Law Judge in his Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law does not address the issue of the
affect the Trade Readjustment Act has on Mr. Wakefield1 s
situation as it relates to the suitability of the work which
Mr. Wakefield accepted with the City of Orem.

VII.

ARGUMENT
The appellant's claim for unemployment compensation

insurance benefits has been denied by the decision of Administrative
Law Judge, Stanley H. Griffin and affirmed by the Review
Board of the Industrial Commission.

This decision of the

Administrative Law Judge does not give the weight of evidence
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to the totality of circumstances surrounding Mr. Wakefield's
employment with the City of Orem and his (reasons for separation
from that employment.
Mr. Wakefield1 s first contact v^ith the City of Orem
was for a position as a concrete worker.

Mr. Wakefield was

told that that position paid $6.66 per hoar.

From the

Transcript of the Hearing dated September 22, 1987 (Transcript)
at Page 000009 "I'd applied for a —

job a|t Orem City.

It

was a concrete worker job for 6.66 and hotar and they filled
it with somebody else.

And he called me tap and said he

wished he'd have hired me, this Mr. Heatob of Orem, City.
The other guy didn't turn out.

And he said that he was

gonna try and create a job for me.
times.

He catLled several

Got a hold of me, said that he cotald create some

type of job partly running the equipment, labor type;
I — I quit Pinkerton's and went there.

so

And I was assuming,

you know,that the job would be close to 61.66 and hour".

The

transcript at page 000022 D'Avington interjects into a
discussion of the rate of pay for a concrete worker, "Oh,
probably 4 to $6".

Further, Judge Griffin's question to

Mr. Wakefield, "Who told you the pay would be 3 and a half?"
At page 000019 of the Transcript was responded to by
Mr. Wakefield, "Mr. Heaton."

At page 000023 of the Transcript
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during a discussion concerning what Mr. Wakefield was told
about the rate of pay with the City of Orem. Mr. Heaton
states,"I— Just can't remember our conversation for sure".
Also, at page 000021 of the Transcript Mr. Heaton states,
"He was interested in concrete work and therefore we start
concrete workers generally at 5.40; and when he said 3.50, we
may have talked about 3.50, but I — the way I remember it
was there w e r e — was that he was going to go to work on
our concrete crew which paid a little more

f

cause it was

specialist and we needed some mowing done so he graciously
accepted to go on a mower for a couple of days.

And I

thought it was to be a 40-hour a week. However, I-- I might
say that we can hire temporary help for 40-hours a week for
6 months.

And there was some talk

about 19 hours a week to

a certain date so that we could have him later for a full
40-hour a week that would run us up into maybe November.

And

he called and said that he was having some family problems.

He

was good to call and say t h a t — say that he couldn't be in.
But I — I thought that he was going to return until finally
he stated that he didn't look like he'd be able to return".
It is apparent from the foregoing references to
the Transcript Mr. Wakefield thought he was to be hired at
a rate of pay of $6.66 per hour.

Neither of the city of Orem
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witnesses, either Ms. D'Avington or Mr. Heaton denied
that such discussions took place.

It was only after

Mr. Wakefield had quit his job with Pinkerton did Mr. Heaton
inform Mr. Wakefield that the rate of pay would be $3.50
per hour.

Mr. Wakefield remembers for certain that Mr. Heaton

told Mr. Wakefield this information.
remember.

Mr. f^eaton does not

Further, Mr. Wakefield had oth^r problems during

his employment at the City of Orem.

Mr. Wakefield1s vehicle

was vandilised, he made safety complaints! and he had
family problems.

Mr. Wakefield denies at,page 000022 of the

Transcript that he quit because of family problems, "No,
that wasn't— I Mean that-- that was my personal problem.
I had my hands full there, too".

Concerning the damage done

to Mr. Wakefield's vehicle, Mr. Wakefield at page 000024
of the Transcript states "I did" in a discussion of reporting
the damage done to his vehicle.

Mr. Heaton states of the

same subject matter, " I — some reason I julsst don't quite
remember that, but-- but he could have donele".
The record on fill herein is perpaps more important
from the aspect of what is not present as to what is present.
For example, Ms. DfAvington claims to have hiring papers on
on Mr. Wakefield, but are not presented as evidence.

No

evident was presented as to Mr. Wakefield1^ scheduled hours
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of work or indeed a written work schedule.
In the totality of Mr. Wakefiel's experience
with employment at Orem City in first being told that he
would be employed at $6.66 per hour, then in reliance upon
that statement by a supervisor of Orem City quitting his
job with Pinkerton, then being employed by Orem City at
$3.50 per hour and then subsequently being paid 4.50 per hour
some three months after his termination of employment with
Orem City,in totality provide circumstances under which equity
and good conscience it would be unreasonable to deny Appellant's
claim for unemployment compensation.
This circumstance of Mr. Wakefield's brings to
mind the unfairness with which employees are treated by the
judicial system in the State of Utah.

The courts have

generated a line of decisions under which am employee without
a written fixed term of contract can be terminated at will
no matter which representations of the employer has made
to the employee.

This instance circumstance is another

example of the judicial system within the State of Utah providing
a license for employers to represent one situation to employees
and then act entirely differently than what was represented
to the employee.
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If this court were to find against the Appellant,
this court would be rewarding the City of Orem for its
mis-communications and mis-representations.
It is not mere happenstance thaij: the Utah
Employment Security Act is couched in the terms that denial of
unemployment benefits should not be again$t equity in good
conscience.

A statute which is written ii|i and couched in terms

of equity should be interpreted in an equitable manner. The
Administrative Law Judge failed to provide any reasoning
concerning the equitable merits of the casA in his findings
of fact and conclusions of law.

Equity would dictate that

the Appellant's claim for benefits be approved.
Further, the Administrative makes no Findings of
Act or Conclusions of Law that indicate tt\e

affect the continued

employment with the City of Orem would ha^e had upon his
application for unemployment benefits whidh had expired on
August lf 1987.

In light of the uncertainty of Mr. Wakefield's

employment schedule with the City of Orem,j inconclusive
evidence presented by the City of Orem as how Mr. Wakefield
would have been scheduled, the lack of contact by the City
of Orem with its employee, Mr. Wakefield spould not be denied
the benefits of unemployment compensation insurance.
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CONCLUSION
From the foregoing arguments it can only be

concluded that Mr. Wakefield1 s unemployment with Orem City
was as the result of reasonable action taken by Mr. Wakefield
which he did within the bounds of equity and good conscience.
Therefore, Mr. Wakefield's claim for unemployment compensation
benefits should be granted.

DATED this

/ \jj\J

day of March, 1988.

ROBERT M. OREHOSKI
Attorney for Appellant

I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the tub

day of March, 1988 of the foregoing

to the following:
David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General
through
K. Allan Zabel
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
1234 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147

ROBERT M. OREHOSKI
Attorney for Appellant

